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Introduction
A poetic old saw has it that “you are what you eat.” The idea has found resonance in rad-
ically different schools of thought down through the ages, but whether one chooses to 
focus on its early Christian expression as a proverb (Gilman 2008) or on the intriguing 
recent attempts to understand the metabolic relations between the foods that people 
consume and the ways in which they behave (McKeith 2005), the common thread is 
that food habits are part and parcel of what makes someone the person that he or she is. 
How and what one eats informs the construction and performance of identities and is 
thus expressive, in some small way, of a person’s conception of and orientation toward 
the Good.
Diet has been an object of philosophizing for millennia, with philosophers of many 
schools sharing the assumption that proper culinary habits are a vital component of 
living well, and that flouting them could have pernicious effects that go beyond merely 
spoiling physical health (see essays by Katja Vogt, Henrik Lagerlund, and Aaron 
Garrett and John Grey, in this volume). Pythagoreans were famously against eating 
beans, but as Aristotle (supposedly) points out, this guideline is just one part of a larger 
vision of life that prescribed physical exercise and meditation, together with a disci-
plined dietary program detailing what, when, and how much to eat (Thompson 2015, 
25– 26). More generally, the Greeks believed in a strong association between eating and 
well- being, and saw a rigorously balanced daily food routine as a form of care of the 
self and expression of excellence. As Thompson also notes, the core Greek virtue of 
temperance grows out of this orientation toward food, coalescing into “the framework 
for philosophical dietetics in the medieval world” (2015, 26) and providing the central 
reason for resisting the simple gratification of personal preferences and the excesses of 
gluttony.
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Later philosophers and other researchers would highlight different aspects of the 
relation between eating and identity. In the mid- nineteenth century in his review of 
Moleschott’s Theory of Nutrition, Ludwig Feuerbach famously stated “Der Mensh ist was 
er isst” (“Man is what he eats”). Feuerbach’s view on these matters evolved as he devel-
oped it (see Harvey 2007), but it is clear that his interest was less on the contributions of 
food to individual well- being and more on the relationship between diet, class, and the 
ordering of society. Indeed, Feuerbach held that food, and at times even details of the 
chemical composition of diet, had a direct relation to the ways in which social identi-
ties were made and enacted. During his time, potatoes constituted the main diet of the 
working class; as Harvey notes, given that “potatoes lack phosphorescent fat and protein 
necessary for the brain, the working class could only hope for revolution by a change in 
diet.” Others like Elias ([1939] 2000) explored the connection between eating and iden-
tity by focusing on the cultural evolution and social function of dining etiquette, and the 
so- called civilizing aspect of disgust in policing boundaries between different groups, 
especially between classes (also Nichols 2000). In light of such work, it becomes evident 
that statements like Jean Anthelme Brillat- Savarin’s “tell me what you eat, and I will tell 
you what you are” are about much more than nutrition and sustenance; food and dining 
put immediate roots into signaling behavior, group membership, social boundaries, and 
the identities of people who must navigate them.
Chemistry offers a very different but not incompatible perspective. From a metabolic 
point of view, there is more than a grain of literal truth to “you are what you eat”: the 
energy and basic biochemical materials by which your body is created, replenished, and 
maintained come in large part from what you consume. Whether some food preferences 
and choices are biologically constrained (e.g., the inability to assimilate certain foods in 
cases like lactose intolerance) or strongly genetically influenced (e.g., the innate human 
preference for sweets), food chemistry provides another way of appreciating the ways in 
which food contributes to and changes the biochemical composition of our bodies. This, 
in turn, opens new avenues for exploring the ways we are inevitably embodied (Shapiro 
2010), and how our personal and social identities are informed by our biological and 
physical identities. The space of inquiry surrounding these issues has traditionally been 
populated by dieticians and nutritionists, but their treatment of them has recently come 
under criticism for contributing to a misleading, overly reductionist way of thinking 
about food (Pollan 2008, esp. section 3 “Getting over Nutritionism”).
So for a long time there has been a kind of allure about the idea that food and identity 
are intimately bound together. Indeed, we are told that a form of magical thinking com-
mon to many primitive cultures included the belief that you could take on the properties 
of the organisms you ate, including even the fighting prowess of vanquished warriors 
from a rival tribe.1 Perhaps vestiges of such magical thinking still lurk in the modern 
mind, waiting to be exploited by clever advertisements. A commercial by Carl’s Jr. and 
1 For psychological research on magical thinking and its connection to disgust, see Nemeroff and 
Rozin 2000.
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Hardee’s promoting their Western X- Tra Bacon Thickburger depicts a female Mystique 
(of X- Men fame) shapeshifting into a bearded man while taking her first bite; such, we 
are invited to infer, is the transformative power of the Thickburger’s manly aura (see 
Adams 2015). In the contemporary environment, the poetic saw has also acquired less 
florid, more abstract, but nevertheless real and important connotations as well. It can 
be used to express something about loyalties to a brand (whether you are a Coke or a 
Pepsi drinker), about socioeconomic status (your insistence that the fruit you eat be 
organic), or about your values in general (forgoing any factory- farmed meat or fish on 
moral grounds).
It is this latter class of connections that we will be mainly concerned with in this essay. 
More specifically, we will unpack the set of relations that hold between food and cuisine, 
eating and dining, and norms, social roles, and identities. Our aim is to express these 
ideas crisply and in a way that is and can continue to be informed by current work in 
empirical moral psychology, broadly construed. In the second section, we unpack how 
we will construe identities, focusing on a core component of them, namely the set of 
social roles that an individual occupies. Next, in the third section, we unpack the notion 
of a social role in terms of social norms, the often unwritten rules that regulate behavior 
and social interactions, and describe recent empirical work that illuminates the power 
and psychological underpinning of norm- based cognition. This discussion, in turn, will 
allow us in the fourth section to remark on the peculiar, expanded role that the emotion 
of disgust has come to play in human moral psychology, regulating dining practices, 
and thus helping shape and maintain personal and social identities; you are what you 
eat, but the flip side of this may be just as telling: you are what you won’t eat, too. Finally, 
in the fifth section, we briefly discuss the implications this perspective might have for 
thinking about food norms, the potential avenues and prospects for changing them, and 
the class of identity- based ethical considerations that different strategies might raise. An 
important upshot is that in light of the connections between food, norms, and identities, 
attempts to alter a person’s eating habits can run up against deep and distinctive forms 
of psychological resistance because they are in part attempts to change who he or she is.
Identities and Social Roles
For our purposes, to say that you are what you eat is to say, roughly, that the food you 
consume (or refuse) and the reason and practices surrounding your consumption 
(or refusal) of it bear some set of interesting and important connections to your iden-
tity. A person’s identity is an encapsulation of who that person is.2 Broadly construed, 
2 Put another way, descriptions of a person’s identity can serve as an answer to what Marya 
Schechtman (1996) calls the characterization question, which she clearly and correctly distinguishes 
from answers to Locke’s problem of personal identity (or persistence) through time, which she calls the 
reidentification question. However, see White (1989) for arguments that identity in the first and second 
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identities include a person’s personality and sense of themselves, as well as other peo-
ple’s sense and recognition of who they are. These senses are typically expressed by and 
reflected in actions, stories, expectations, and interactions. Hilde Lindemann sketches a 
concise picture:
Identities function as counters in our social transactions, in that they convey under-
standings of what those who bear them are expected to do. If an answer to “Who are 
you?” is “the bartender,” for example, I expect you to know how to mix a martini; if 
the answer is “a practicing Muslim,” I don’t. Moreover, identities also convey under-
standings of how those who bear them may be treated. If you’re my three- year- old 
son, I can remind you to use the toilet, but if you’re my boss, I’d better not. Personal 
identities thus make intelligible not only how other people are supposed to act, but 
how we are supposed to act with respect to them. (Lindemann 2014, 5– 6, italics in 
original)
Later she stresses that while identities often serve to compress information and help 
people make sense of themselves and others, they are not merely descriptive: “identi-
ties are normatively prescriptive— they tell you what you are supposed to do and how 
others may, must, or mustn’t treat you” (87, italics added). As Lindemann’s sketch illus-
trates, crucial to an individual’s identity are the variety of parts she plays and positions 
she occupies, and the expectations and guidelines that attach to and make up those parts 
and positions. We can unpack these core elements of identities in terms of the notion of 
a social role and that of a social norm.
The notion of a social role may be a familiar one, but it is worthwhile to flesh out 
the general idea a bit. Typical examples of social roles that individuals might occupy 
include overt ones such as their profession (bartender, lawyer, community organ-
izer), religion (practicing Muslim, lapsed Catholic), marital or family status (husband, 
divorcée, great aunt, son), and membership in various organizations (citizen of Costa 
Rica, treasurer of the local chapter of PETA, goalie on the soccer team). Other social 
roles are more covert, less explicitly or obviously social roles. Examples of these might 
include membership in a particular race, ethnicity, gender, or category of mental ill-
ness.3 Any given individual typically occupies many different social roles at once (a 
Tico mother who is a bartender and goalie), and the set of social roles an individual 
senses have more in common than typically thought, especially if one accepts the kind of social role and 
social norm centric account of identities we are working with.
3 Views that categories such as these are socially constructed can be expressed in terms of social roles; 
for the discussion and development of such a view about race, see Mallon and Kelly 2012. As we note 
presently in the main text, different social roles vary along a number of dimensions, and one important 
way that social roles like race and gender, for example, differ from more obviously socially constructed 
ones is that occupancy in the former is often not optional or chosen by the individual occupying it. This 
feature, in turn, can lend intuitive support to the type of view the social constructivist rejects, namely 
that membership in the category is based on some intrinsic, non- social (perhaps biological) feature of 
individuals. As many theorists point out, occupation of these non- voluntary social roles is too often 
accompanied by systematic oppression and prejudice (for discussion, see Young 2004).
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occupies typically changes over the course of a lifetime (one can become a father, leave 
the legal profession to become a chef, or resign from the NRA). Note that given the 
inclusive sense in which we are using the notion here, other features of social roles can 
vary along a large number of dimensions as well. They can range from the very general 
(bartender, Muslim, woman) to the very specific (weekend day shift bartender at the 
Tiny Tap, interim treasurer of the local chapter of PETA), from the voluntary and overt 
(bassist in a garage band) to the involuntary and covert (Latino man) and from those 
that come with a very specific set of expectations and guidelines (starting goalie on the 
soccer team) to those that have very few (lapsed Catholic). Moreover, the social roles 
an individual occupies can be more or less central to her sense of herself and to how 
others understand and respond to her.
However they might vary on these kinds of dimensions, social roles share some gen-
eral features. Occupying a social role means being a member of a socially recognized 
category, being treated and thought of as an instance of that category by members of the 
wider cultural community (including, often but not always, the occupier of the social 
role herself), and thus being subject to many of the same sorts of norms and social pres-
sures as other individuals who occupy that social role.
While there are obviously many nuances involved in thinking about identities 
(for overviews and a broad range of perspectives, see Appiah 2007; Korsgaard 2009; 
Witt 2012; Lindemann 2014; cf. Shoemaker 2016), we will use this characterization 
of social roles to capture the core part of an individual’s social identity, of who she is, 
that is made up of the set of social roles she occupies (and, assuming personal his-
tory contributes to identity, she has occupied in the past). Social roles can be further 
analyzed in terms of different kinds of psychological entities, about which a wealth 
of empirical research can be brought to bear to help illuminate details about differ-
ent aspects of identities.4 Of particular importance, especially given that identities are 
action guiding and tailored to specific roles and groups, we focus on the key category 
of social norms.
4 Ron Mallon’s work (e.g., 2003, 2014, 2016) can be used to characterize social roles more precisely and 
explicitly in terms of many theoretical entities of contemporary cognitive science:
(1) There is a conception of the role that includes
(a) a term, label, or mental representation that picks out a category of individuals R
(b) a cluster of informational states (beliefs, stereotypes, exemplars, scripts) about that cate-
gory R and the individuals who occupy it
(c) a cluster of social norms centered on that category R
(2) Many or all of the informational states and social norms that make up the conception are 
widely shared by members of a community, as is the knowledge that they are widely shared, 
and so forth; the conception of R is common knowledge.
 (3) Since the descriptive elements help in identifying and determining expectations about 
instances of the category, and the normative elements prescribe and proscribe behaviors 
in situations likely to arise in interactions with occupiers of the social role, conceptions are 
action guiding. Put another way, conceptions not only help recognize members of R as such 
but also specify appropriate behavior by and toward members of R.
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Social Norms
A venerable tradition in philosophy sees significance in the fact that, from a subjective 
viewpoint, some rules seem to impress themselves upon us with a distinctive kind of 
authority or normative force: one feels their pull and is drawn to act in accordance with 
such rules, and violations seem charged, egregious. Although the first person experi-
ence of it can be mystifying, there is reason to think this phenomenology is just one 
aspect of the operation of a psychological system crucial to morality, ethical thought, 
and sense of self.
Recent research on human capacities for moral judgment and social behavior 
sheds light on the psychological machinery underpinning social norms (see Boyd 
and Richerson 1985, 2005; Chudek and Henrich 2011; Henrich 2015). These are 
the often unwritten rules of social life, rules that may or may not also be codified 
in formal institutions, but that either way deeply and directly influence our moral 
intuitions, judgments, and actions. This “suite of genetically evolved cognitive mech-
anisms for rapidly perceiving local norms and internalizing them” (Chudek et al. 
2013, 443) is invoked to help explain the evolution of distinctively human forms of 
prosociality and large- scale cooperation. These mechanisms also help explain behav-
ioral, cognitive, and cultural differences between groups, as well as diversity in the 
different kinds of normative standards that apply to occupants of different social 
roles within groups.
This account of human norm psychology connects the individual capacity for learn-
ing and internalizing social information to regularities in the social environment con-
cerning interactions between different types of people. A psychological mechanism for 
norm acquisition is posited to be present in the minds of individuals, but it monitors 
and extracts information from other people, about the roles they play, about appropri-
ate ways to interact with each other in different settings and situations, and particularly 
about the ways they cooperate with each other— and punish those who fail to cooperate. 
The account holds that humans share a universal set of cognitive mechanisms that not 
only support acquisition of local social norms, but underpin the performance of norms, 
producing the motivation to comply with those norms that they have internalized as 
applying to themselves, and to punish others who violate norms that apply to them and 
the roles they occupy. The appeals to both innate structure and social learning allow 
the account to accommodate the fact that norms are a ubiquitous and crucial part of 
human social life in all cultures. However, the content of social norms varies greatly, 
both from one culture to the next and between different members of a single culture, 
especially with respect to the social roles different members occupy. The account is also 
well equipped (was motivated) to capture and explain the fact that social norms change 
and evolve over time.
Sripada and Stich (2007) emphasize other psychologically interesting features of the 
norm system, especially about the way it processes information; it is fast, intuitive, auto-
matic, and thus difficult to intentionally stop, and its operation is implicit and not easily 
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accessible to introspection.5 They argue that there is a distinctive motivational signa-
ture associated with social norms, marshaling evidence that in internalizing a norm, a 
person thereby acquires intrinsic motivation to both behave in ways that conform with 
the norm, as well as intrinsic motivation to punish, or at least direct punitive attitudes 
toward, those who violate it. Calling these paired motivations intrinsic means that they 
are not instrumental: one does not comply with a social norm merely as an intermedi-
ate step toward satisfying some more basic urge nor does one punish merely as a means 
to attain some further, more primary end. Rather, it is simply a feature of a person’s 
norm psychology that when it recognizes she is in a situation to which one of its pro-
prietary rules applies, the system produces motivation to comply, and when she detects 
another person violating one of those rules, the system produces motivation to pun-
ish. The character of this motivation can vary from one norm to the next, however, and 
not just in intensity and objective. More interestingly and importantly, different norms 
can draw on different emotions (anger, jealousy, disgust, admiration), with details of the 
behaviors and attitudes associated with the norm being colored by the character of the 
emotion to which it is linked (more on this later, but see Shweder et al. 1997; Rozin et al. 
1999; see also Haidt and Joseph 2007; Graham et al. 2009). In virtue of this kind of emo-
tionally valenced intrinsic motivation, social norms can influence intuitions, choices, 
behaviors, and social interactions independently of any formalized institution, codified 
set of laws, or explicit, material system of incentives and disincentives. And in virtue of 
much of this psychological processing happening without effort or attention, and below 
the level of conscious awareness, the influence of social norms can be immediate and 
thus potentially mysterious from a first person perspective. As mentioned, social norms 
can also be enshrined in law and enforced with institutionalized mechanisms of pun-
ishment and reward— a rule X can be widely distributed in psychological norm systems 
of the individual members of a culture, and rule X can also be explicitly articulated and 
officially recognized by that culture’s legal system— but they need not be to shape the 
social life or have a deep psychological grip on the members of the culture. Social norms 
are often the proverbial “unwritten rules” that organize and regulate many spheres of 
action, define social roles, and shape people’s identities, and can do so, and can remain 
motivationally powerful, even when they remain covert.6
5 In cognitive scientific terms, many of these features are characteristic of modular or System 1 
processing. Dual process theories of mental architecture distinguish these from central or System 2 
psychological mechanisms and processes, whose operation is by contrast slow, explicit, requiring effort 
and attention, and conscious and easily accessible to verbal report. The locus classicus is Fodor 1983; for 
more recent discussion, see Carruthers 2006; Kahneman 2011; and for a particular application to moral 
psychology, Greene 2014.
6 See Mallon (2016) for an illuminating discussion of overt and covert social roles, and what he 
calls the “revelatory aims” many social constructivist theorists have with respect to covert social roles. 
Categories like race, gender, and mental disorder are covert, claims the social constructivist, because 
it is not obvious that they denote social roles, or because the intuitive, received view is that they are 
natural, biological, or otherwise non- socially constructed categories. The aim is to reveal that they are, 
in fact, socially constructed, and to show how, despite initial appearances, the intuitive, received view is 
mistaken.
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Details about the internalization of norms are also important, since they can explain 
why the social norm a person has internalized can shape feelings about identification 
and the right thing to do. Even though one may have never reflected upon, explicitly 
articulated, let alone consciously endorsed, many of the unwritten rules that she has 
internalized, she might experience the influence of those norms as something like the 
urgings and motivations of a conscience or a true inner self. Once a social norm has 
been picked up and internalized by a person’s norm psychological cognitive architec-
ture, it can subjectively seem natural, compelling, normatively authoritative, and thus 
contribute to her sense of what kind of a person she is and should be, how she should 
interact with others, and where she fits into the larger social scheme.7 Even though a 
person may not be able to easily verbalize many social norms she has internalized, those 
unwritten rules can shape thoughts, emotions, and behavior, and delineate the social 
roles that become a core part of her identity.8
The cultural and moral ecology— the marketplace of ideas, perhaps— in which social 
norms are acquired and transmitted is far from monolithic or static, of course. In addi-
tion to characterizing the special capacity for recognizing and internalizing social 
norms, defenders of this account also make a convincing case that the capacity is subject 
to several kinds of learning biases (e.g., Richerson and Boyd 2005). For example, and 
perhaps least surprisingly, when faced with more than one potential norm to follow, 
a conformity bias makes people more likely to adopt the norm most common among 
their perceived peers.9 Another important type of bias is sensitive to prestige and makes 
7 See Hacking’s classic “Making Up People” (1986) for a complementary discussion.
8 This psychological story dovetails nicely with Charlotte Witt’s view about what makes an individual 
subject to the normative force of any particular social norm or social role. She convincingly rejects the 
perhaps better known voluntarist view associated with Kantians like Korsgaard (1996) that (roughly) 
the authority a norm holds over an individual rests in the individual’s conscious endorsement and 
acceptance of it. Against this, Witt defends a limited ascriptivism, the idea that in many important cases, 
norms are ascribed to an individual by others, and so that the individual is responsive to and evaluable 
under those norms, even if the ascription is made without the individual’s consent or even explicit 
knowledge. As Witt points out, individuals do not voluntarily choose what culture they are born into or 
many of the social roles they occupy within it. Thus, they do not choose which social norms will apply to 
them, or even which norms they will internalize as applying to themselves. Hence, voluntary acceptance 
or endorsement does not determine which norms others will evaluate their actions by, which norms they 
will be socially pressured to comply with, and even which norms they may feel intrinsically motivated 
to conform to themselves. She goes on: “ascriptivism adds to the richness of our understanding of the 
grip of oppressive social norms by explaining why an individual might feel drawn under the normative 
umbrella of a social role which she is also at the same time critical” (47). And, given the account of norms 
and norm internalization we have described, we can also explain why an individual might feel drawn 
under and psychologically influenced by a norm that she has not fully articulated to herself or even 
become explicitly aware of.
9 There are complications, of course, perhaps most interesting of which is that norms and other units 
of cultural transmission are not discrete, and social learning is not a particularly high fidelity process. 
An upshot of this is that a social learner can blend together information from several cultural parents to 
arrive at a new norm, one that bears more resemblance to an “average” of those found amongst her peer 
group than to any particular instance antecedently found in that peer group (see Henrich and Boyd 2002; 
Henrich et al. 2008).
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social learners more likely to acquire norms demonstrated by those held in high regard 
or seen to have the greatest success and status. These biases affect how norms are trans-
mitted and thus how they change over time.10
Dining and Disgust
Charlotte Witt, whose discussion of the connections between social norms, social roles, 
and identities informs much of our discussion here, and whose ascriptivism about social 
normativity we take to be supported by the empirical picture developed in the last sec-
tion, nicely articulates the distinction between feeding and dining:
Consider the natural phenomenon of feeding. Feeding is an animal function, and 
it is realized in and by animal bodies. In human societies, feeding (which requires 
bodies with specific organs— mouths, tongues, stomachs, intestines along with other 
material conditions) is elaborated into the social function of dining by an array of 
social norms. Dining is a socially mediated form of feeding . . . connected intimately 
to biology and to bodies and their organs. (Witt 2012, 37)
The “many, elaborate social norms that govern dining” (37) are a subset of the cate-
gory we will call food norms, which can include norms about what types of plants, ani-
mals, and other substances are appropriate to be consumed, how different types of food 
should be acquired and prepared, what types of person are fit or unfit to prepare and 
eat certain types of food, and the package of norms that assigns roles to individuals and 
choreographs the many smaller individual and joint behaviors that need to mesh during 
the complex dance of a collective meal. As Witt points out, even dining norms are not 
merely about edibility, nutrition, the pragmatics of eating, or the coordination of meal- 
related behaviors. They also structure the social practices surrounding food and eating 
in ways that give them and their component parts meaning and cultural significance.
Two more points from recent empirical work on social norms can help flesh out Witt’s 
picture. The first is that of all of the emotions, disgust tends to play a predominant role 
in dining and is the emotion most prevalent in food norms more generally.11 This is 
10 Theorists of our status psychology also draw a distinction between prestige, which they take to be 
a uniquely human form of status rooted in cultural information and success, and dominance, which, 
while still present in humans, is much more widespread in nature, and rooted in coercion and the 
potential to inflict physical harm (Henrich and Gil- White 2001; Henrich 2015, ch. 8). We think it likely 
that dominance plays an interesting and important role in food practices and norms, and potentially in 
the development of food preferences. As far as we know, this role has not yet been well explored, though. 
Thanks to Patrick Hoburg for discussion on this point.
11 Indeed, many food norms fall under the broader category of purity norms, which are typically 
associated with and follow the logic of disgust (Shweder et al. 1997; Horberg et al. 2009; Rottman and 
Keleman 2012).
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understandable, given that the primary evolutionary functions of disgust are, on the one 
hand, to monitor potential foods and protect against eating what might be toxic, poi-
sonous, or otherwise cause insult to the delicate human gastrointestinal system, and, on 
the other, to act as the first line of defense of the human immune system, monitoring the 
environment, particularly other people, for evidence of potential sources of infection, 
and producing aversion toward and avoidance of anything that presents such a threat. 
As norms sprung up around the most pragmatic aspects of the gathering and prepara-
tion of food, disgust would have been a natural candidate to provide the intrinsic moti-
vation associated with them. Moreover, due to the intrinsic salience of food to disgust, 
together with its sensitivity to other people as sources of social information about what 
is disgusting, as eating became culturally elaborated into dining, disgust would have 
once again been the emotion most suited to plug into the norms governing dining. It 
would thus exert its subtle but potentially important proprietary influence on the asso-
ciated clusters or practices and social roles.12
The second point is that eating and food norms are likely to play an important part 
in people’s identities; and via this route, so is disgust. It follows that the empirical 
research on norms, disgust, and the interaction between the two can shed light on how 
those identities are likely to be formed and maintained, how they are liable to change 
and resist being changed, and thus how people’s food- related habits may or may not 
be susceptible to being nudged in various ways. There are more general connections 
between norms and identities (i.e., clusters of norms help constitute particular social 
roles, and the set of social roles a person occupies makes up a core part of her identity). 
The empirical perspective on norms can add detail to this. For instance, the emphasis 
on the variability of social norms from one culture to the next, from one social role to 
the next, even from one person to the next, points to the importance of ethnic bound-
ary markers: easily detectable cues displayed by a person that signal information about 
who she is. These serve as visible proxies for more abstract psychological properties 
that may not be directly perceivable or easily manifest, such as what groups a person 
belongs to and values she embraces, which social roles she occupies, which norms 
shape her judgments and actions, and thus what others should expect of her, and how 
they should interact with her and evaluate what she does. Indeed, there is reason to 
think that the psychological capacities for social norms evolved in tandem with simi-
larly universal and emotion- involving psychological capacities that make us sensitive 
to social role occupancy, group membership, and ethnic boundary markers, as part of a 
larger package of uniquely human cooperative abilities that have been called our “tribal 
social instincts” (see Richerson and Boyd 2001, 2005, ch. 6; Richerson and Henrich 
2011; Kelly 2013, 2011, ch. 4).
12 For more extensive discussion and citations on the empirical side, see Rozin et al. 2008; Kelly 2011; 
Chapman and Anderson 2013; and Strohminger 2104; and for empirically informed debate about the 
normative questions concerning the putative moral authority of disgust and the different roles it should 
or should not play in social contexts, Plakias 2013; Clark and Fessler 2015; Kelly and Morar 2014; Fischer 
2015; and Kumar 2017.
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Eating is a universal, biologically inescapable activity that is necessary for sur-
vival, it is typically a social experience, and it is heavily monitored and regulated.13 
It thus provides a rich arena of information salient to these tribal instincts and their 
various concerns— and thus for the performance of identity: following the proper 
sequence in which to serve food, and appropriately portioning out the choicest 
morsels to the most prestigious people at the meal; knowing which utensil to use, 
how, and for what; or choosing to observe or flout persnickety etiquette rules about 
which one is fully aware. As many have noted, even specific cuisines are bound up 
with identity and can serve as ethnic boundary markers, especially types of food 
celebrated and relished by members of one group, but found disgusting by mem-
bers of others. Paul Rozin and Michael Siegal (2003) present some experimental 
evidence along these lines concerning Vegemite and its unique place in Australian 
identity, but other examples include pairings like escargot and France, sushi and 
Japan, and jellied moose nose and indigenous populations of Canada and Alaska. 
In today’s global village, food preferences may vary in this way more dramatically 
along socioeconomic lines than traditional cultural lines, thus marking the bound-
aries between class more often and effectively than between nationalities. In gen-
eral, the signaling function remains the same, though: you are what you eat, but you 
aren’t what you won’t eat, too.
The larger class of food norms, including those having to do with the more eth-
ical dimensions of what we eat and the moral reasons for eating or not eating it, 
are likely to have deep psychological connections with people’s identities and their 
sense of disgust, and thus who they are and what kind of person they take them-
selves to be— and what kind of person they aspire to be. This dimension of psycho-
logical complication suggests one reason that mere appeal to utilitarian calculations 
or deontological obligations may fall on deaf ears, or at least fail to be persuasive or 
motivating, namely because such appeals might fail to effectively speak to the iden-
tity component of eating and dining. However, the empirical research might be lev-
eraged; proposals for how to best communicate arguments about more ethical food 
practices, promulgate new food norms, or effectively change eating habits can take 
into account the empirical psychological research, both on tribal instincts and the 
way disgust is likely to inform the domain of food norms and cuisine- based identity 
displays.
13 Sterelny (2012) develops an extensive and convincing case that some of the most ancient, persistent, 
and multifaceted collective action problems faced over the course of human evolutionary history were 
food- related: the production of hunting and cooking equipment, the division of labor in the gathering 
and preparation of edible plants, the organization and assignment of roles for coordinated hunting 
strategies, the fair distribution of food once it has been acquired, particularly in the case of a single 
large calorie haul that can result from a successful hunting effort, and so on. This picture implies that 
the connections between our cooperative psychological capacities, on the one hand, and the norms 
and practices surrounding food, on the other, are far from recent or superficial. Our concern for food is 
primal and runs deeply through our tribal social instincts.
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Disgust, Identity, and the Ethics   
of Improving Eating Habits
Thus far, we have attempted to develop a concise account of the construction and main-
tenance of identities in terms of social roles that brings to bear the burgeoning empir-
ical literature on social norms, and via this, highlights the centrality of disgust in the 
cognition of dining norms. Our account complements the work of anthropologists and 
sociologists who focus on culture (Douglas 1966; Goody 1982; Bourdieu 1987), but we 
emphasize that eating and the norms that govern it cannot be fully captured in social 
and cultural terms because dining is equally shaped by stable features of human psy-
chology. Whether one is interested in the development of food preferences, the rise of 
specific food practices (e.g., locavorism— Oxford dictionary word of the year 2007), or 
the significance of networks of representation and meaning associated with certain cui-
sines (e.g., veganism vs. pescatarianism), it is obvious that such phenomena cannot be 
captured with biological or psychological resources alone. We hold that they cannot be 
fully explained by cultural and social factors alone, either. The interrelations between 
dining, identity, and emotions like disgust are multifaceted, and an epistemological and 
methodological pluralism is needed to understand them in their full messy complexity.
Here we briefly sketch two types of ethical implications that can be drawn from our 
own pluralist account. The first concerns how use of disgust makes it too easy to dehu-
manize those people whose eating habits are targeted. The second is that, given the 
connection between dining and identity, attempts to modify eating habits could raise 
interesting and distinctive problems, both practically and ethically. We end by reflecting 
on these and setting out some questions suggested by the view we have presented.
Dehumanization
There is an important distinction between two kinds of claims ethicists might be mak-
ing in the normative debates that have recently swirled around disgust. One kind con-
cerns whether and when feelings of disgust, in and of themselves, should be taken to 
justify the judgments that they accompany. For example, should the putatively wide-
spread (see May 2016) reaction of disgust toward emerging practices like human cloning 
or the replacement of natural foods with GMOs be taken as a reason in favor of the view 
that such developments are morally wrong— and should widespread disgust inform 
how different institutions react to such practices and emerging biotechnological pos-
sibilities? The other kind of claim concerns whether and when it would be acceptable to 
cultivate widespread feelings of disgust toward different kinds of objects, broadly speak-
ing, and thus which ethical and political uses of disgust are morally appropriate. Is, in 
other words, disgust an admissible social tool, one that might be harnessed by activists 
and policymakers to bring about morally and socially desirable ends (directing disgust 
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at wildly unhealthy foods or barbaric factory farming conditions to discourage certain 
eating habits), or is there something about the emotion itself that renders it ethically 
ill- suited for such purposes? While we have defended skeptical positions with respect to 
each of these (Kelly and Morar 2014), it is this second kind of issue that concerns us here.
Consider the West Australian Live Lighter Campaign.14 The ad opens with a man 
reaching into the fridge for a slice of pizza. While sizing up the slice, he reaches down 
and squeezes his belly. At that moment, the camera moves inside the man’s body, reveal-
ing slabs of thick, viscous yellow fat covering his organs. As a voiceover calls obesity 
toxic and describes how it increases risk for disease, the viewer experiences embarrass-
ment at the man’s lack of control over his eating, and the visual spectacle triggers a vis-
ceral sense of disgust. Obviously, this ad aspires to more than merely informing viewers 
of nutritional facts (e.g., about how diets high in carbohydrates lead to unhealthy levels 
of fat storage). It also employs disgust- inducing imagery in an attempt to alter people’s 
behavior and combat eating habits that might be engrained in many people’s daily rou-
tines. What harm in giving into the temptation to enjoy a last slice of pizza, eat one— 
just one!— more potato chip, indulge in another bit of instantly gratifying, nutrition be 
damned, tasty at any cost foodertainment? On the other hand, who wants to be gross, 
bloated with nasty yellow goop? That’s disgusting.
It is not the effectiveness of disgust in getting across this kind of message that 
we doubt (Marks 2006), but rather the moral defensibility of using it in such ways. 
Emotional appeals of all sorts probably make public health messages, like most other 
kinds of messages, more likely to be understood, remembered, and perhaps even acted 
on.15 But features of the particular emotion of disgust make its use in these kinds of mes-
sages, directed at people, in this case those with unhealthy eating habits, unacceptable. 
Perhaps most worrisome for such tactics is how disgust dehumanizes those toward 
whom it is directed. Many writers have documented the long history of this particular 
emotion’s role in stigmatization, prejudice, and oppression (especially Nussbaum 2004, 
2010). We think this appalling history is no accident. The recent empirical research on 
disgust shows that the relation between disgust and dehumanization is not that of a 
good (or even neutral) tool that has an unfortunate record of abhorrent uses, but rather 
that the dehumanizing propensity is intrinsic to the tool itself. The activation of disgust 
disrupts or reduces the disgusted person’s ability to fully “see” the object of disgust as an 
agent. If, say, you are disgusted by a group of people, or the occupants of a certain kind 
of social role, you become less sensitive to their intentions and the cues that signal their 
intentions (Russell and Giner- Sorolla 2011; Young and Saxe 2011; for complementary 
neurocognitive evidence gathered using fMRIs, see also Harris and Fiske 2006, 2007). 
Not only is disgust intrinsically dehumanizing in this way, but it appears to be uniquely 
so; most of these empirical results are comparative and show that other related emotions 
like anger and contempt do not have similarly disruptive effects on social cognition. 
14 See Rebecca Kukla’s contribution to this volume for more discussion of this example, as well as the 
more general philosophical issues we discuss in this section.
15 For empirical evidence about disgust along these lines, see Heath et al. 2001 and Nichols 2002.
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This is perhaps due to disgust’s distinctive evolutionary roots in dealing with poisons 
and parasites rather than navigating the subtleties of interpersonal interactions and the 
social world. Whatever the ultimate explanation, it remains that making an individual, 
or group of people, into an object of disgust makes it difficult to think of them as fully 
human and deserving of full moral status. Once they are seen as disgusting, they become 
easier to dismiss, to demonize, and to treat hideously; that which is gross is disposable.
There are other components of the disgust response that we think also make it unsuit-
able for these kinds of social uses. To be disgusted by something is to conceptualize it as 
aversive and to be avoided. But it is also to conceptualize it as tainted and contaminat-
ing, able to pollute with its disgustingness other things that it comes into close proxim-
ity with, physically or figuratively. This property of the emotion is understandable and 
adaptive when it is functioning to protect against communicable diseases and track the 
cues that accompany them, but it contributes to the sticky stigmatizing power of disgust 
when the emotion operates in the social arena. Since the different elements of disgust 
tend to cluster together as a psychological package, the dehumanizing propensity can 
be transmitted via this same mechanism of contamination sensitivity. Disgustingness 
is likely to bleed beyond its intended boundaries, encompassing not just the sin but also 
the sinner, bringing its dehumanizing stigma with it.
Returning to food and eating habits, the idea of harnessing this emotion to advance 
some well- intentioned program or even just help get a public health message across 
seems misguided to us. Disgust may be a powerful tool to change individual and collec-
tive behavior, but we hold that there is good moral reason to refrain from using it, even 
in the service of advocating for morally laudable ends like more compassionate food 
production practices, healthier eating habits, or more just food norms. The advantages 
it would bring to the cause are far outweighed by, but also psychologically inseparable 
from, its attendant risks. Indeed, the unintended or unanticipated effects of such uses 
could be morally disastrous, especially when social disgust is normalized, and modern 
technological, advertising, and media sophistication is used to make a category of peo-
ple into the target of the collective disgust of an entire population.16
Nudges and Identity Tampering
Our second concern centers on the view we have developed about dining and identity 
and its relevance for the use of nudges in food policy.17 Here we aim to raise questions 
rather than fully articulate and defend a position. Ethicists and social theorists have 
long recognized the trade- offs between individuals’ right to a sphere of unencumbered 
16 For an interesting discussion about the potential of disgust to stir up moral panics and drive the 
creation and stabilization unjust laws, see Douard 2007.
17 Earlier drafts introduced the terminology of “identity- based harms,” but we decided we did 
not want to contribute to the “concept creep” of the notion of harm in psychology and philosophy 
(Haslam 2016).
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autonomy, on the one hand, and the right of others’, including the state and other insti-
tutions, to place limits on that sphere (see Sarah Conly’s contribution to this volume). 
In the case of public policy attempts to improve eating habits and install more healthy 
and humane food norms, the tension can be understood as a worry about approaches 
that are overly paternalistic. Even when they are well- intentioned and the ends to 
which they aspire are morally laudable, policies that would limit individual choice in 
the name of public health and well- being risk crossing the line, illegitimately interfering 
with people’s capacity for self- determination, even if that capacity is often exercised to 
make unhealthy or morally questionable but perfectly legal food choices. We will frame 
our two points about this tension in terms of the viability of the tactics now commonly 
described as nudges.
Debates rage about where the line should be drawn between acceptable measures 
and those that are unacceptably coercive or manipulative, and on what grounds that 
line should be established and justified (e.g., Hausman and Welch 2010; Saghai 2013; 
Sunstein 2014). Some have explored reasonable boundaries on paternalistic public 
health policies that limit consumers’ freedom in the name of healthier eating practices, 
including those that appear to directly impinge on consumer choice by delimiting the 
range of food options among which they can choose available (e.g., the SNAP sugary 
drink ban or the New York big soda ban). Many appeal to economic and the medical 
arguments for justification (Basu et al. 2014). Others comment on the idea that less 
restrictive message- based programs are more likely to be effective when they also draw 
an emotional response. Critics have raised legitimate worries about the potential side 
effects of such policies, pointing out how they are liable to reinforce the stigmatization of 
obesity or incite unwarranted blame toward lower income segments of the population 
for their dietary choices and poor health (Barnhill and King 2013).
The notion of a nudge and the development of an accompanying vocabulary cen-
tered on it have been welcome recent advances. Measures that were once perceived 
as stark limitations on personal autonomy (Resnik 2010) are now easier to see as ele-
ments of larger, previously unappreciated “choice architectures.” These, proponents of 
nudges argue, have always been present, have usually been shaped by some interested 
party or other, and are practically inescapable, even if they are only now becoming 
the objects of scientific study (and of systematic ethical debate as such). The liber-
tarian paternalist deployment of nudges and choice architectures seeks to act prima-
rily on the set of available alternatives among which agents can choose, or to appeal 
to non- rational ways of influencing an agent’s choice by, say, arranging food options 
in cafeterias in a way that promotes the best nutritional choices without hindering 
one’s personal preferences (see the example of Carolyn the director of food services 
in the introduction of Thaler and Sunstein 2009, 3– 5). The framework is controversial 
but intriguing and certainly advances a sophisticated conception of human agency 
that both properly appreciates the influence of situational and ecological factors on 
human behavior (cf. Doris 2002; Clark 2007) and seeks to countenance, anticipate, 
and often preemptively compensate for the litany of imperfections that riddle human 
decision- making, for example, overconfidence, motivated cognition, status quo and 
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confirmation biases, cognitive inertia, the multitude of fallible heuristics (anchoring, 
availability, representativeness) on which we constantly rely, seemingly, ad infinitum 
(Ariely 2010; Kahneman 2011).
In other places, debates specifically about food can feel caricatured and could benefit 
from more nuance.18 One way to achieve this is by taking into account a wider range of 
factors, like for instance the fact that certain food experiences can have value for indi-
viduals independently of their relationship to deliberate and informed choices (Barnhill 
et al. 2014). Our concern can perhaps be located among this wider range of factors that 
deserve more attention. Not every act of eating is equally representative of a deep self, 
but people’s identities are often inscribed in their diets and food practices; there are dis-
tinctively Italian ways to cook and eat pasta that many would consider central to being 
a “true” Italian, or particularly French ways to taste and appreciate pungent cheeses that 
many French people would consider an important part of their self- conception (de 
Solier 2013). We have argued that these types of relations between dining and identity 
are robust and have deep psychological roots. We further hold that these relations and 
the relevant aspects of identity should be taken into account when assessing the viability 
and acceptability of nudges designed to improve eating habits and modify food norms. 
In short, attempts to alter some eating habits will also be attempts to alter something sig-
nificant in people’s identities.
One set of problems this could raise has to do with the practical effectiveness of eating 
habit nudges. People may be more willing and able to change shallower aspects of them-
selves, behaviors or tendencies that they take to be more peripheral to their identities, 
but less willing and able to change those that are more central, or that they take to be 
expressive of who they really are. Or in the terms we introduced earlier, nudges could 
bump up against a food norm that is resistant to change because complying with it is 
an important way to signal commitment to a larger group, or because it is woven into 
an especially stable social role that many people strongly identify with and do not wish 
to abandon. Asking (or subtly prodding) people to change such eating habits and the 
norms that govern them is asking (or subtly prodding) them to change who they are. 
Changes could be practically harder to achieve because the identity- based psychology 
of some dining practices runs “deeper” than that associated with run of the mill cases 
of behavior, even habitual behavior. This seems to us an open and interesting empiri-
cal question. The prominence of disgust in food norms may add an additional psycho-
logical wrinkle to this question about the likely effectiveness of eating habit nudges. It 
could also inform one of the factors that Thaler and Sunstein appeal to in justifying the 
use of nudges, namely that nudged choosers often approve of nudges because they see 
themselves as making better choices (i.e., better by their own standards of evaluation), 
whatever those may be. However, people may be less likely to so favorably assess a nudge 
that turned them into an object of public disgust (or an object of self- disgust, for that 
matter).
18 Not too much, though (Healy, 2017).
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A related set of problems is about not practical viability but justification and moral 
acceptability. Again, there will be a line between acceptable and overly coercive or manip-
ulative nudging strategies, and different factors should be taken into consideration when 
deciding where it should be drawn. Our questions here center on whether and when moral 
appraisal should take account of identity. Is asking someone to change who they are and 
take themselves to be asking too much, or does subtly prodding them into altering certain 
behaviors amount to tampering with their identity? What are the conditions under which 
it is permissible to challenge a person’s identity? When, if ever, is it permissible to tamper 
with it in less overt ways? Where do these factors sit with respect to those more common to 
discussions of paternalism and nudging, and how should they be weighed?
For example, there is a family of views on which autonomy and agency are deeply 
bound up with a person’s ability to express her identity through her actions, or act out 
his deepest self in his deeds (Benson 1990; Lindemann 2014, esp. ch. 3; cf. Sripada 2016). 
Critics could use such views to build a case that tampering with people’s identities is 
tampering with their agency and constitutes a kind of infringement on their autonomy. 
These infringements, like other infringing factors, need to be taken into consideration 
when assessing the moral acceptability of different nudging strategies. Moreover, given 
the overlap of food and dining with identity, these kinds of factors are likely to loom 
large when thinking about eating habit nudges. Certainly this line of thought needs to 
be spelled out in much more detail, but we hold that it is intriguing and worth pursuing, 
and hope to have laid some of the necessary groundwork for exploring it more carefully 
in the future.
Conclusion
If you are what you eat, then attempts to change what and how you eat are, in effect, 
attempts to alter your identity, who you are. Given the connection between food prac-
tices, dining norms, and identities, we have argued that there is another dimension 
along which arguments and attempts to change food practices and dining norms need 
to be evaluated, namely the dimension that considers if and when it is permissible to 
change a person’s identity. Moreover, we have developed an account of identities in 
terms of social roles and social norms, which allows a wealth of work in empirical moral 
psychology on the acquisition and performance of social norms to be brought to bear on 
questions of how identities are psychological housed and how they might be effectively 
altered. It also illuminates the role that disgust is likely to play in food practices and 
dining norms, and the kinds of benefits and drawbacks this is likely to bring with it. We 
have argued that the nature of disgust restricts the uses to which it might justifiably be 
put in the service of creating more ethical eating habits.19
19 Thanks to Lacey Davidson, Patrick Hoburg and the editors of this volume for useful feedback on 
earlier drafts.
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